RECENT CASES
for the purpose of obtaining control of the company without first offering it to all the
shareholders.
In support of this decision it may be said that to the average shareholder the preemptive right is the only sure protection against dilution of his interest, even though
the courts would probably protect him where such right does not exist if he could show
breach of duty by directors. But it is often difficult to prove that directors were acting
fraudulently, in violation of their fiduciary obligations, when they issued corporate
stock to strangers, and it is too expensive a procedure for the small stockholder to
bring a suit without certainty of recovery. Frey, Shareholders' Pre-emptive Rights,
38 Yale L. Jour. 563 (1929).
On the other hand, in favor of limiting the pre-emptive right wherever possible,
there is the suggestion that under our modern complex corporate systems with many
different classifications of stock the pre-emptive right raises too many insoluble problems and hinders the directors in efficient corporate financing. Berle and Means, The
Modem Corporation (ist ed. 1032), 176-178; Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (rev. ed. 1932),
§ 5136; Drinker, The Preemptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Shares,
43 Harv. L. Rev. 586 (1930).

But in any event, where the stockholder has been deprived of the pre-emptive right
safeguard against dilution through exception, qualification, or waiver, the courts
should, as in the principal case, require a high degree of duty on the part of directors,
and should be on the alert to prevent fraudulent and inequitable dilution of the stockholder's interest.
NATHAN WOLFBERG

County Boards-Jurisdiction-Collateral Attack Based on Facts outside the
Record-[Nebraskal.-Compiled Statutes of Nebraska 1929, C. 2, Art. ii, prescribed
that if a remonstrance petition be filed with the county board against the allowance of
a budget for the county farm bureau, the county board shall place the proposition on
the ballot at the next election. After an enumeration of the qualifications for, and
number of the remonstrators necessary, the statute provided that "in considering the
sufficiency of the remonstrance, the county board shall ignore the names of remonstrators who had previously signed a petition for the organization of the farm bureau."
The Fillmore county board determined, upon hearing, that such a petition complied with the statute and ordered the county clerk to place the proposition on the
ballot. Plaintiffs, taxpayers of the county, seeking to enjoin the clerk, alleged that
many of the remonstrators were in fact disqualified, despite the finding of the county
board. On demurrer the lower court granted the injunction. Held, that the decree be
reversed and the bill dismissed; the county board acted quasi-judicially in determining
the sufficiency of the petition and its judgment could not be attacked collaterally but
only in a direct proceeding which was available to the plaintiffs. Everts v. Young, 251
N.W.

1O9

(Neb. 1933).

County boards, boards of county commissioners or supervisors, and like inferior
tribunals, being creatures of statute, must affirmatively show on the record of their
proceedings a compliance with the statutory prerequisites known as jurisdictional
facts; otherwise their orders or decisions may be collaterally attacked. Larimer v.
Krau, 57 Ind. App. 33, io5 N.E. 936 (1914); Hinton v. Perry County, 84 Miss. 536, 36
So. 565 (1904); Adams v. First NationalBank of Greenwood, 103 Miss. 744, 6o So. 770
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(1913); Doody v. Vaughn, 7 Neb. 28 (1879); Letherman v. Hauser, 77 Neb. 731, 110
N.W. 745 (19o6). These jurisdictional facts may be classed as (i) quasi-jurisdictional,
those which only need be established to the satisfaction of the statutory tribunal, and
(2) strictly jurisdictional, those which must be actually present to give validity to the
order or decision. Quasi-jurisdictional facts, when shown on the record to be established to the satisfaction of the statutory tribunal, cannot be made the basis for a collateral attack on the tribunal's order or decision. Noble v. Union River Logging Ry.,
147 U.S. 165, 13 Sup. Ct. 271, 37 L. Ed. 123 (1893). But with strictly jurisdictional

facts, even though the record affirmatively states their existence, a collateral attack
will be allowed by showing their absence. McCarterv. Sooy Oyster Co., 78 N.J.L. 394,
75 At. 211 (IgIo).

Since the authorizing statute may require the existence of either type of fact, strictly jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional, it becomes necessary to determine from the
language of the statute which is required in any particular case. In such a determination the attitude of the court will play a large part, for a specific requirement of either
type of fact is seldom made by the words of the statute. Thus it was held in State v.
McClymon, 7 Oh. Dec. Rep. iog, i Wdy. Cinnc. L. Bull. 116 (1876), that a specified
number of signatures to a petition was a fact of strict jurisdiction, while in Ward v.
Board of Commissioners, 199 Ind. 467, 157 N.E. 721 (1927), the court decided that the

same fact was quasi-jurisdictional.
One line of authority assumes that the statutory requirements are strictly jurisdictional unless the contrary is specified. Chase v. Trout, 146 Cal. 350, 8o Pac. 8i (19o5);

Wilcox v. Engebretsen, 16o Cal. 288, 116 Pac. 750 (1911); Miller v. Amsterdam, 149
N.Y. 288, 43 N.E. 632 (1896); State v. McClymon, 7 Oh. Dec. Rep. 1O9, i Widy. Cinnc.
L. Bull. 116 (1876). Such an approach seems to impair the efficacy and value of these
statutory tribunals. Preferable is the opposing line of authority, represented by the
principal case, which regards the requirements of the statute, unless prevented by a
clear expression in the statute, as quasi-jurisdictional. Hull v. Board of Commissioners,
195 Ind. 150, 143 N.E. 589 (1924); Ward v. Board of Commissioners, igg Ind. 467, 157
N.E. 721 (1927); Reich v. Cochran, 1o5 App. Div. 542, 94 N.Y.S. 404 (1905); County of
Lewis v. Montfort, 72 Wash. 248, 130 Pac. 115 (1913). This latter view of course would

still recognize as strictly jurisdictional, matters the lack of which would subject even
the decisions of courts of general jurisdiction to collateral attack, such as the facts
necessary for jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter.
In the present case, the court was aided in reaching its decision by the phrase in the
authorizing statute, "in considering the sufficiency of the petition," which suggests
that the finding of the county board was to have some finality, the inference from that
being that the requirements were quasi-jurisdictional. Since a statutory appeal was
available, in which the absence of both type of jurisdictional facts might be shown, the
plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the court's holding. Larimerv. Krau, 57 Ind. App. 33,
105 N.E. 936 (1914); Hinton v. Perry County, 84 Miss. 536, 36 So. 565 (19o4); Taylor v.
Davey, 55 Neb. 153, 75 N.W. 553 (1898); Campbell Co. v. Boyd County, 117 Neb. 186,
22o N.W. 240 (1928); Abraham v. Homer, 102 Okla. 12, 226 Pac. 45 (1924). Where

such statutory appeal is not provided for, injunctional relief might well be allowed.
Ackerman v. Thummel, 40 Neb. 95, 58 N.W. 738 (1894).
WALTER W. BAKER

